




Consumer Attitudes and the Epidemiology of Inflation Expectations




Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Ehrmann, M., Pfajfar, D., & Santoro, E. (2014). Consumer Attitudes and the Epidemiology of Inflation
Expectations. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2014-029). Economics.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.

























































CentER, EBC, University of Tilburg
Emiliano Santoro§




This paper studies the formation of consumers’ inflation expectations using
micro-level data from the Michigan Survey. It shows that beyond the well-established
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purchasing attitudes matter. Respondents with current or expected financial dif-
ficulties, with pessimistic attitudes about major purchases, or who expect income
to go down in the future have considerably higher forecast errors, are further away
from professional forecasts and have a stronger updward bias in their expectations
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How do consumers form inflation expectations? This question is of critical importance
for central banks and macroeconomists, since inflation expectations are known to affect
the actual evolution of inflation and of the macroeconomy more generally. Recognizing
this importance, central banks have in the recent decades devoted considerable efforts
to anchor inflation expectations, for instance by announcing inflation targets. While
a substantial body of empirical research has shown how professional forecasters form
their inflation expectations (among many others, see Capistrán and Timmermann, 2009;
Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2010), much less is known about the formation of inflation
expectations by consumers.
A number of factors have been identified that shape the level of inflation expecta-
tions. Souleles (2004) shows that consumer expectations are biased and ineffi cient, with
forecast errors being systematically correlated with demographic characteristics. Several
socioeconomic characteristics are known to affect inflation expectations —females tend to
have higher inflation expectations than men, and inflation expectations tend to decrease
with income and education, whereas they are often found to be higher for older consumers
(Jonung, 1981; Bryan and Venkatu, 2001; Lombardelli and Saleheen, 2003; Christensen,
Els, and Rooij, 2006).
Inflation expectations are also shaped by the inflation that consumers actually ex-
perience —first, inflation expectations are shaped much more by the inflation rate of
consumption baskets that relate to the respective socioeconomic group to which the in-
dividual belongs than by the overall inflation indices, at least for low education and low
income consumers (Pfajfar and Santoro, 2009; and Menz and Poppitz, 2013); second,
inflation expectations vary positively with the inflation experience that individuals have
made over their lifetime (Lombardelli and Saleheen, 2003; Malmendier and Nagel, 2013);
third, more frequently purchased items have been found to have a higher impact on in-
flation perceptions and inflation expectations (Ranyard, Missier, Bonini, Duxbury, and
Summers, 2008; Georganas, Healy, and Li, 2014).
The evolution of consumers’inflation expectations has also been studied. In his sem-
inal paper, Carroll (2003) has demonstrated that consumers update their expectations
only infrequently (roughly once every year), that they respond to media reporting and
update towards the expectations of professional forecasters, and that inattention to news
generates stickiness in aggregate inflation expectations. Subsequently, a number of contri-
butions have studied the expectation-formation process in more detail. With regard to the
updating frequency, Doepke, Dovern, Fritsche, and Slacalek (2008) apply Carroll’s frame-
work to European data, and report a somewhat lower updating frequency of around 18
months. Using the Michigan Household Consumer Survey microdata, Dräger and Lamla
(2012) provide evidence that quantitative inflation expectations are adjusted relatively
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frequently, whereas the qualitative assessment (whether prices in general will go up, go
down, or stay where they are now) changes less often. Qualitatively, the expectations
tend to change mostly if the quantitative adjustment is substantial. Furthermore, they
find the updating frequency to vary over the business cycle. Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2012) model the responsiveness of expectations to macroeconomic shocks, and confirm
the presence of imperfect information not only for consumers, but much more broadly for
professional forecasters, firms, central bankers and financial market participants.
The second aspect of Carroll (2003), the role of media reporting for inflation expec-
tations, has also been taken further by a number of subsequent studies. Inattention by
consumers has been found to be important in Mankiw and Reis (2002), Mankiw, Reis, and
Wolfers (2004) and Reis (2006). Lamla and Maag (2012) analyze the effect of media re-
porting on disagreement among forecasters, and find professional forecaster disagreement
to be unaffected by media coverage, whereas disagreement among households increases
with higher and more diverse media coverage. Pfajfar and Santoro (2009) provide evi-
dence that the effect of news on inflation expectations differs across socioeconomic groups,
and Easaw, Golinelli, and Malgarini (2013) demonstrate that also the rate at which the
professional forecasts are embodied in the households’expectations depends on socioe-
conomic characteristics, such as education. Finally, Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) highlight
the importance to differentiate between media reporting about inflation and whether or
not a consumer has actually heard news about prices. Their study replicates Carroll’s
finding that inflation expectations get updated towards the professional forecasts using
aggregate data —however, this is not the case at the individual household level, where
most consumers who update actually revise their expectations away from the profes-
sional benchmark. The reason for this discrepancy is that there are many households
updating away from the professional forecasts, but with small amounts, such that these
are dominated in the aggregate data by the relatively larger updating towards profes-
sional forecasts by relatively few households. Differences in the magnitude of revisions
that take place in response to news have been identified by Armantier, Nelson, Topa,
van der Klaauw, and Zafar (2012), who find larger revisions for agents that start offwith
relatively less precise expectations.
The current paper tries to understand these findings better by studying how the updat-
ing processes differ across household groups. The paper expands the previous literature
by focusing not only on the well-established socioeconomic criteria that have been found
to shape inflation expectations like gender, education and income, but by furthermore
identifying other household characteristics that affect the formation of inflation expecta-
tions, such as households with diffi cult current and expected financial situations and with
pessimistic consumer attitudes. A small number of related studies have provided some
evidence in that direction. Webley and Spears (1986) show that UK consumers who think
they do less well financially than during the previous year, as well as consumers who ex-
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pect to be worse off in the subsequent year have higher inflation expectations. Similarly,
del Giovane, Fabiani, and Sabbatini (2009) and Malgarini (2009) find that inflation ex-
pectations of Italian consumers are higher for respondents with pessimistic attitudes, and
for households in financial diffi culties. How can this be rationalized? First, if consumers
struggle to meet ends with their available budget, this could be due to a reduction in
their income or due to an increase in their expenditures —which in turn could be due
to several factors, one of them being rising prices for their consumption bundle. Under
uncertain information and information processing constraints, it might well be that such
consumers estimate inflation to be higher than others. Second, it has been shown that
financially constrained consumers are more attentative to price changes of the goods they
purchase than more affl uent consumers (Snir and Levy, 2011). Combining this with the
well-known notion that agents are more receptive to bad than to good news (see, e.g.,
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, and Vohs, 2001) might well imply that financially
constrained households arrive at a higher estimate of inflation.
To study the questions at hand, we employ the same data source that has been used in
many of the studies following Carroll (2003), namely the Michigan Household Consumer
Survey. This data source has a long history, allowing us to study a time sample from
1980 up to 2011. In line with current best practice, we study the microdata from this
survey, which enables us to split the respondents according to their characteristics. Our
estimates are based on nearly 70,000 observations of inflation expectations by households
that are interviewed twice, such that we can observe how their inflation expectations
change over time.
The first key finding of the paper is that consumer attitudes as well as households’
current and expected financial situation have a bearing on inflation expectations. Con-
sumers with pessimistic attitudes about major purchases (such as purchases of durables,
houses or vehicles), consumers who find themselves in diffi cult financial situations, or
consumers who expect income to go down in the future have larger forecast errors, are
further away from professional forecasts and have a stronger upward bias in their expec-
tations. Broadly, the same also holds for low-income households, for respondents with
lower education levels, for the elderly and for female respondents, as established in the
previous literature.1
As already established in the previous literature, we find that consumers are responsive
to news. We employ two news measures, the first based on the survey itself (where
respondents can report whether or not they have recently heard news about prices), the
second one following Carroll (2003) based on intensity of news coverage related to inflation
in the New York Times and the Washington Post. While both of these measures have
been used previously, e.g. in Pfajfar and Santoro (2013), it has not been discussed how
1See e.g. Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu (2001), Lombardelli and Saleheen (2003) and Chris-
tensen, Els, and Rooij (2006).
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they differ, and how each of them would have to be interpreted. In this paper, we clarify
that whether or not respondents have heard news about prices is very tightly linked to
gasoline price inflation in the United States. This relationship is in line with earlier
evidence that frequently purchased items (such as gasoline) shape inflation perceptions
of consumers, and also likely reflects the fact that gasoline prices are extremely salient
due to their prominent postings at gas stations.
Interestingly, our two news measures have very different implications for consumer
inflation expectations. Having heard news about prices (reflecting predominantly large
increases in gasoline prices) increases the bias and worsens forecast accuracy. In contrast,
more intense media coverage tends to reduce the bias and improve forecast accuracy. In
that regard, the second key finding of this paper is that households with more strongly
upward biased expectations are more responsive to media coverage, and see their bias
shrinking by more than the other household groups.
These findings have interesting implications for policy makers and the media, sug-
gesting that more reporting about inflation improves consumers’inflation expectations,
and particularly so for consumers that are in the right tail of the distribution, i.e. have
a particularly strong upward bias.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data
used in our empirical analysis and provide some first stylized facts. Section 3 contains
an overview of the econometric approach that we employ, while Section 4 reports the
relevant results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Preliminary Evidence
Household-level data contain information on a wide range of factors that influence con-
sumers’expectations. As such, they allow us to explore the process of expectation up-
dating in greater detail. In this section we describe the key features of the data set and
report some preliminary evidence on households’and professional forecasters’ inflation
expectations, as well as on the newspaper index proposed by Carroll and a direct measure
of consumers’receptiveness towards news on prices. Moreover, we report some descriptive
statistics about household-level characteristics that are accounted for as determinants of
the process of expectation formation.
2.1 Inflation Expectations
The Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior is a representative survey conducted by
the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan (Curtin, 2013). The
Michigan Survey (henceforth, MS) has been available on a monthly basis since January
1978. The short rotating panel design represents its main peculiarity: 40% of prior
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respondents are re-interviewed in every round, the remaining 60% being initial interviews
from a random sub-sample of the mainland U.S. population that has a landline telephone.
As we are interested in how consumers update their inflation expectations, we will restrict
our analysis to the second interview, which leaves us with 67,116 observations. From a
total of 71,629 re-interviews, we lose 6.3% of observations due to question attrition (i.e.,
4,513 individuals decided not to provide a year-ahead inflation expectation), which we
will control for in our econometric estimates.
Participants are asked two questions about expected changes in prices: first, they are
asked whether they expect prices to go up, go down or stay the same in the next 12
months; second, they are asked to provide a quantitative statement about the expected
change.2
As to professional forecasts, Carroll employs the mean inflation expectation from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (henceforth, SPF). The SPF, currently conducted by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, has collected and summarized forecasts from
leading private forecasting firms since 1968. The survey questionnaire is distributed once
a quarter and asks participants for quarter-by-quarter forecasts, spanning the current
and next five quarters.3
Insert Figure 1 here
The analysis will focus on the 1980M1-2011M12 period.4 Figure 1 reports mean
forecasts of households and professionals against CPI inflation.5 Both surveys appear to
predict inflation reasonably well, although they often fail to match periods of low inflation.
For instance at the very end of the sample, from 2009-2011, they are considerably higher
than actual inflation turned out to be. This episode has been studied by Coibion and
Gorodnichenko (2013), who suggest that due to high oil price inflation, household inflation
expectations were elevated, which in turn could have helped explaining the "missing
2If a respondent expects prices to stay the same, the interviewer must make sure she does not actually
expect that prices will change at the same rate they have changed over the past 12 months. In line with
common practice, we discard observations if the respondent expects inflation to be less than -5% or
more than +30%. This rule only affects 0.7% of the observations in the sample under scrutiny. Curtin
(1996) also adopts alternative truncation intervals, such as [-10%,50%], showing that the key statistical
properties of the resulting sample are close to invariant across different cut-off rules.
3The SPF was previously carried out as a joint product of the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) and the American Statistical Association (ASA) on a wide variety of economic variables, in-
cluding GDP growth, various measures of inflation and the rate of unemployment. For a comprehensive
analysis of the SPF forecasts, the interested reader should refer to Croushore (1998). In order to obtain
a monthly estimate of the SPF we may consider two options: either forecasters keep their forecast until
the next survey round, or their "monthly" forecast includes a partial adjustment to the next quarter
forecast. We took both approaches and obtained nearly identical results. In the present version we
linearly interpolate between quarters to account for missing monthly observations.
4SPF forecasts of CPI inflation are only available from 1981Q3. Therefore, from 1980Q1 to 1981Q3
we proxy the SPF mean forecast of CPI inflation with the mean forecast of the GDP deflator. The two
series are highly correlated.
5Inflation expectations carried out at time t are graphed with inflation 12 months later, to be in line
with the forecast target.
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disinflation" in the United States (i.e. the fact that standard Phillips curves would have
predicted a disinflation over that period that did not materialize).
2.2 News on Inflation
A direct implication of Carroll’s view is that more media reporting should imply that
people are better informed and produce better forecasts. To test this hypothesis, we
require reliable indicators of the flow of news on inflation that the public is confronted
with. Carroll computes a yearly index of the intensity of news coverage in the New York
Times and the Washington Post. In this paper, we use the monthly version of this index
that has been constructed in Pfajfar and Santoro (2013). It is based on a search of each
of the two newspapers for inflation-related articles, converted into an index by dividing
the number of inflation-related articles by the total number of articles.6
In addition, our analysis will rely on a measure of consumers’ perception of new
information about prices. This is intended to be a complement to the newspapers index
proposed by Carroll. In fact, the accuracy of a proxy based on the intensity of news
coverage on national newspapers can be questioned on different grounds. For instance,
Blinder and Krueger (2004) suggest that consumers primarily rely on information about
inflation from the TV, followed by local and national newspapers.7 It is also plausible
to expect that the volume of news about inflation does not necessarily match the flow of
information that is assimilated by the public. In this respect, a non-trivial discrepancy
could result from the interplay of two mutually reinforcing effects: (i) news from the
media do not necessarily reach the public uniformly and (ii) the connection between
news and inflation expectations is likely to be affected by consumers’ receptiveness to
these news and the capacity to process new information. Indeed, Sims (2003) emphasizes
the presence of information-processing constraints that could be compatible with such
ineffi ciencies. Finally, it is well known that consumer inflation perceptions are shaped —in
line with Tversky and Kahneman (1974) availability heuristic —by frequently purchased
items (Ranyard, Missier, Bonini, Duxbury, and Summers, 2008), such that in periods
where inflation of such items is high, consumers’might be more aware and concerned
about inflation, whereas media reporting (which most likely is generally concerned with
overall inflation) need not be more intense.
In light of these considerations, it is advisable to complement the analysis with a
variable that accounts for consumers’actual perceptions of inflation. Such a variable is
directly available from the MS, where respondents are asked whether they have heard
6A potential problem connected with this type of search is that the resulting index may include articles
that do not primarily cover US inflation. Accordingly, Pfajfar and Santoro (2013) tested the robustness
of this methodology by restricting the search to articles that just cover US inflation, and found results
to be robust.
7Since their article, the internet has furthermore become a more important source of news on various
economic statistics.
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of any changes in business conditions during the previous few months. In case of an
affi rmative response, they have the possibility to give two types of news that they have
heard about, among them being either higher or lower prices.8
Insert Figures 2 and 3 here
Figure 2 reports the fraction of MS respondents that have heard news about prices,
together with the newspapers index and CPI inflation. The two series display poor
correlation, suggesting that they contain two distinct measures of news. The fraction
of MS respondents that have heard news about prices exhibits more volatility than the
newspapers index. Especially in the last part of the sample it displays sizeable fluctuations
that neither actual inflation nor the newspapers index present. Splitting the series into
the share of respondents that have heard news about decreasing and increasing prices,
respectively, it is evident that most of the volatility in the overall series arises due to
movements in the share of consumers that have heard about rising prices (see Figure 3).
So what is behind this measure of news? As shown in Figure 4, the correlation
between the share of respondents reporting to have heard about price increases and
inflation of retail gasoline prices is very high (0.63).9 Based on this evidence, we inter-
pret the survey-based news measure as capturing inflation perceptions originating from
frequently-purchased items such as gasoline prices. In contrast, the correlation between
negative inflation rates in gasoline prices and the share of respondents reporting to have
heard about decreases is much smaller (0.23), which is in line with the prospect theory
pioneered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), as agents tend to manifest higher recep-
tiveness towards "bad" news on prices, as compared with "good" news.
Insert Figure 4 here
2.3 Household-level Attributes
The core of our econometric analysis focuses on the connection between consumers’infla-
tion expectations and a number of household-level attributes. These can be grouped in
the following categories: the current and expected financial situation, consumer attitudes
towards major purchases, and the classifications used in the previous literature, namely
gender, income, age and education of the respondent. The attributes are constructed
using the survey responses as follows:
8The MS respondents primarily report about news on unemployment, followed by news on the gov-
ernment (elections) and then prices. It is important to stress that 41% of the respondents report having
heard no news at all and that in 28% of the cases only one type of news is reported. This is to say that,
on average, only 31% of the respondents are confronted with a potentially binding limit of two options.
Therefore, though some underreporting may affect our measure of perceived news about prices, this is
not likely to be primarily induced by the specific design of the questionnaire.
9For that chart, we set any negative gasoline inflation numbers to zero, to reflect the fact that the
survey news measure only reflects having heard about price increases.
8
Financial situation
• Financial situation worse: Individuals responding "worse" to the following ques-
tion: Would you say that you are better off or worse off financially than you were a
year ago? From this category, we exclude all individuals that name high(er) prices
as one reason of being worse off, in order to avoid a possible endogeneity bias.
• Financial expectations worse: Individuals responding "will be worse off" to the
following question: Now looking ahead—do you think that a year from now you will
be better off financially, or worse off, or just about the same as now?
• Real income expectations worse: Individuals responding "income up less than prices"
to the following question: During the next year or two, do you expect that your
income will go up more than prices will go up, about the same, or less than prices
will go up?
• Nominal income expectations worse: Individuals responding "lower" to the follow-
ing question: During the next 12 months, do you expect your income to be higher
or lower than during the past year?
Purchasing attitudes
• Time for durable purchases bad : Individuals responding "bad" to the following
question: Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or a bad time for people
to buy major household items? Again, to avoid possible endogeneity, we exclude
all respondents that respond "Prices are too high, prices going up" to the following
question: Why do you say so? (Are there any other reasons?).
• Time for house purchases bad : Individuals responding "bad" to the following ques-
tion: Generally speaking, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to buy a
house? Once more, we exclude those that are pessimistic due to high(er) prices.
• Time for vehicle purchases bad : Individuals responding "bad" to the following
question: Speaking now of the automobile market — do you think the next 12
months or so will be a good time or a bad time to buy a vehicle, such as a car,
pickup, van, or sport utility vehicle? Also here, we exclude individuals that give
high or rising prices as a reason for their answer.
Other characteristics, following the previous literature
• Income bottom 20% : Individuals in the bottom 20% of the income distribution (as
identified by the MS).
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• Low education: Individuals with education less than 9th grade (i.e., no high school
diploma).
• Elderly: Respondents that are at least 65 years old.
• Female: Female respondents.
For each of these categories, we construct a dummy variable that is equal to one in
case the attribute applies, and equals zero otherwise.
Insert Figure 5 here
Figure 5 gives an impression of the time variation in household characteristics, for
the example of purchasing attitudes. It reports the share of pessimistic households, and
demonstrates that this share varies substantially over time.10 It is apparent that at the
end of the sample, with the U.S. economy going through the financial crisis and a major
recession, many more consumers felt that times were not good for major purchases.
Table 1 provides a number of summary statistics for each consumer group. It indicates
how many respondents fall into each category and also provides tests for whether the news
reception and the inflation expectations of the various respondent groups are statistically
significantly different from those of their peers. The table reports 8 different statistics.
First, the percentage of households who have heard of news about prices (NEWSP ).
Second, the updating frequencies of respondents (UPDT ), i.e. whether their inflation
expectations change from the first to the second interview. Along with this, we also
compute the frequency of those who update towards the SPF mean forecast (UPDT F )
and those who move closer to actual inflation (UPDT π). Further, we report the difference
between the MS household-specific forecast and the SPF mean inflation forecast (BIASF )
and the difference between the MS household-specific forecast and CPI inflation (at the
forecast horizon, BIASπ). Finally, GAPSQF is the squared difference between the MS
household-specific forecast and the SPF mean inflation forecast, and GAPSQπ is the
squared difference between the MS household-specific forecast and CPI inflation (at the
forecast horizon), providing us with a measure of their forecast errors.
A number of interesting results emerge. The chosen household groups have higher
inflation expectations, higher updating frequencies, worse forecast errors, and tend to be
further away from the expectations of professionals than their comparator group. How-
ever, there is not much variation in the average frequency at which households update
their inflation expectations between the first and the second interview, neither towards
the professional forecasters’mean forecast, nor actual inflation. While these descriptive
10Due to the lack of information about the identification of survey respondents taking part to the
second interview, it has not been possible to retrieve reliable statistics in the following periods: 1980:3,
1980:12, 1982:11, 1989:11. Therefore, we have opted for treating the corresponding datapoints as missing
observations.
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statistics are unconditional, i.e. do not correct for possible differences in other character-
istics of the various household groups, we will see in the subsequent econometric analysis
that even controlling for other characteristics, this overall picture is confirmed.
A question that arises is to what extent the various household categories that we
distinguish are correlated, or in other words whether one can assume that they are rea-
sonably independent to warrant a separate analysis. Table 2 reports pairwise Pearson
correlations among the attributes we include in the analysis, and shows that even if all
the correlations are highly statistically significant, they are not very large from an eco-
nomic point of view, such that we proceed with the assumption that the characteristics
are suffi ciently unrelated to warrant separate analysis and to allow a direct interpretation
of their effects.
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here
3 Econometric Frameworks
This section explains the main econometric frameworks employed in the analysis. As
mentioned before, out of an overall sample of 71,629 re-interviewed individuals, 4,513
individuals did not provide their inflation expectations. This may represent a potential
source of bias. In order to account for question attrition, we therefore implement the
Heckman correction (Heckman, 1979), a procedure that offers a means of correcting for
non-randomly selected samples.
3.1 Bias
The first question that we will address is whether the inflation expectations of our house-
hold groups are more upward biased than those of their peers. For that purpose, we
specify the following linear regression model:
BIASi = α1 + ciα2 +NEWS
P
i α3 +NEWS
Nα4 + xiα5 (1)
+ciNEWS
P









where BIASFi is the difference between the MS household-specific forecast and the SPF
mean inflation forecast, and BIASπi is the difference between the MS household-specific
forecast and CPI inflation (at the forecast horizon). A comparison with actual, realized
inflation, will tell us about the overall bias of inflation expectations, whereas the com-
parison with the SPF is meant to compare consumer expectations against a forecast that
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is in principle conditional on the same information set, namely the information available
at the time of the forecast.
α1 is a constant, ci denotes the household classification of interest, NEWSPi is an
individual-specific indicator of news perception (which equals one if the interviewee has, in
the previous months, heard of recent changes in prices and zero otherwise), and NEWSN
indexes the intensity of news coverage at the time of the survey.11 xi is a vector of so-
cioeconomic characteristics (namely gender, age, income, education, race, marital status,
location in the US)12 and ui is assumed to be normally distributed. We also interact
the household classification variable with each of the news intensity measures. While
α2 will reveal whether or not the various household groups differ in their frequency of
updating, the parameters α6 and α7 will provide us with information as to whether they
furthermore differ in their response to news.
For these regressions we calculate robust standard errors using the sandwich estimator.
3.2 Expectation Updating
Subsequently, we will study two aspects related to the updating of inflation expectations.
First, we are interested to learn whether our household groups update more often than
their peers, given that they are likely to be affected more by changes in inflation. To
explore the determinants of expectation updating at the household-level, we specify a
probit model. The following variable is defined:
zi =
{
1 if z∗i > 0
0 if z∗i ≤ 0
, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (3)
where z∗i is the latent variable that accounts for consumers’expectation updating. Its
discrete counterpart, zi, takes the value one if the ith respondent has changed her expec-
tations from the first interview, and zero otherwise. Since individuals are interviewed
only twice, the only reference term to determine whether expectation updating has taken
place is represented by the response in the second interview. The following latent process
11In a robustness test, we will also include the last observed CPI inflation rate. We have furthermore
considered the possibility that consumers look at alternative inflation measures, such as the average rate
of inflation over the six months re-interview period, but did not obtain different results.
12Household income is grouped into quintiles and age is measured in integers, while education is split
into six groups: “Grade 0-8, no high school diploma”, “Grade 9-12, no high school diploma”, “Grade
0-12, with high school diploma”, “4 yrs. of college, no degree”, “3 yrs. of college, with degree” and
“4 yrs. of college, with degree”. Race is grouped into “White except Hispanic”, “African-American
except Hispanic”, “Hispanic”, “American Indian or Alaskan Native” and “Asian or Pacific Islander” ,
while marital status as “Married/with a partner”, “Divorced”, “Widowed”, “Never married”. Finally,
the region of residence is grouped into “West”, “North Central”, “Northeast”, “South”.
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is assumed:
z∗i = α1 + ciα2 +NEWS
P
i α3 +NEWS
Nα4 + xiα5 (4)
+ciNEWS
P
i α6 + ciNEWS
Nα7 + ui.
Standard errors for the marginal effects are calculated with the delta method (Oehlert,
1992).
A second question related to the updating of expectations is whether consumers up-
date towards the SPF or actual inflation, i.e. whether the updated expectations have
improved over time. To check for updating towards the SPF, we define a dummy variable
that is equal to one if abs(Ei,t2πt2+12 − EFt2πt2+12) < abs(Ei,t1πt1+12 − EFt1πt1+12), where
EFt is the mean expectation operator of the SPF at time t, t1 denotes the time of the first
interview, and t2 the time of the second interview. For updating towards actual inflation,
the equivalent dummy variable is defined to be equal to one if abs(Ei,t2πt2+12− πt2+12) <
abs(Ei,t1πt1+12 − πt1+12). Again, this variable is modeled in a probit framework.
4 The Determinants of Consumer Inflation Expecta-
tions
Having specified the data and the econometric model, we will now move on to discuss
the econometric results. We first analyze whether consumer inflation expectations are
biased relative to professional forecasts and relative to actual inflation. From there, we
go further and study the updating of expectations.
4.1 Bias
Turning to the analysis of the bias, Tables 3 and 4 confirm the previous findings that
consumer inflation expectations are biased upwards. The constant reflects the conditional
bias of a representative agent with the following characteristics: white (non-Hispanic),
married, male, 40 years old, with a high school diploma, with an income in the mid-
dle quintile of the distribution and living in the North-Center of the country, and it
is estimated to be statistically significant and positive both when we compare inflation
expectations against those of professional forecasters in Table 3, and when we compare
against realized inflation in Table 4.
While the inflation expectations of the representative consumer are biased upwards,
the bias is substantially larger for the household groups that we study. With the exception
of respondents that find their current financial situation to have worsened, all other groups
have a larger bias. Relative to professional forecast, the magnitude ranges from 0.36%
for respondents that are pessimistic about the purchases of durables to 1.2% for those
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that expect real income to decline. Similar orders of magnitude are also observed for the
bias of the various socioeconomic groups that the literature had pointed out previously
(e.g., 0.5% for females, and 1.3% for the elderly). These results also hold when consumer
inflation expectations are compared to actual inflation in Table 4.
Having heard news about prices, which is heavily influenced by increases in gasoline
prices, furthermore adds to the bias, increasing it by around 1%. Interestingly, this effect
does not differ across household groups, suggesting that the effect of gasoline price in-
flation on inflation expectations is universal, and relatively homogeneous across different
consumer types. Compared to having heard news about prices, actual media reporting
exerts a rather different effect. First, it has the opposite direction: more media report-
ing about inflation tends to reduce the bias in inflation expectations. A one-standard-
deviation increase in media reporting (i.e., a change in the index by 4%), ceteris paribus,
leads to a reduction in the bias of around 0.3 to 0.4% when measured against actual
inflation, and of around 0.7 to 0.8% when measured against the SPF. The effect is es-
timated to be different across household groups, with a larger reduction in the bias of
pessimistic consumers and those in dire financial situations; when calculated relative to
actual inflation, the effect often is twice as large as for the average consumer. This result
suggests that more news coverage is beneficial in that i) it reduces the bias in inflation
expectations of the average consumer, and ii) it does so particularly for those consumer
groups that had a larger bias to start with. Finally, the inference confirms that it is
important to account for question attrition, as we can appreciate from the statistical sig-
nificance of the coeffi cient attached to the residuals from the selection regression (rho).
This property tends to hold for most of the subsequent econometric analysis.
Insert Tables 3 and 4 here
4.2 Expectation Updating
Table 5 reports results for the determinants of the updating frequency, by providing
marginal partial effects. A number of results stand out. First, it is apparent that the
financial situation and the purchasing attitudes have a bearing on how often households
update their inflation expectations — those with diffi cult current or expected financial
situations and those who believe that times are bad for purchasing durables, houses or
vehicles are 2 to 4% more likely to change their inflation expectations between the two
survey interviews, an effect that is estimated to be highly statistically significant in all
cases. Similar results are also obtained for the standard categorization variables age and
gender —only education does not seem to matter.
Consumers who have recently received news about prices are also more likely to up-
date their inflation expectations, and the same holds true for a higher news intensity
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in the media. Finally, even if there are different updating frequencies across the house-
hold groups, there is no evidence that the updating depends on the news intensity in a
differential manner.
Insert Table 5 here
Finally, we look at the prediction of Carroll’s (2003) model, namely that more media
reporting will lead consumers to update towards a more rational forecast. Table 6 shows
results for the probit model that tests whether consumers’inflation expectations in the
second interview are closer to those of the SPF than in the first interview; Table 7
compares whether inflation expectations move closer to actual inflation outcomes in the
second interview.
Looking at Table 6, it is not apparent whether consumers do indeed update their
forecast towards the SPF. For some model specifications, it seems that consumers on
average update away from professional forecasts when media reporting intensifies, while
for most model specifications, no statistically significant effect is found. This is in line
with the previous evidence by Pfajfar and Santoro (2013), who found that some consumers
update away from professional forecasts, whereas others update towards them —in which
case we would not expect to find statistically significant effects. Their paper furthermore
shows that most consumers update away from professional forecasts, which is consistent
with us finding such an effect in some specifications.
When we study whether consumers expectations are updated towards actual inflation,
i.e. whether actual forecast errors become smaller, results are more interesting (see Table
7). In line with the results in the previous section, we find that consumers who have
heard news about rising prices will find their forecast deteriorating, whereas more news
reporting in the media tends to make consumers update their forecasts towards actual
inflation —even if the magnitude of the effect is small. Interestingly, these effects are not
significantly different for the various consumer groups that we distinguish. In combination
with the finding that their bias is reduced more strongly in response to media reporting,
this suggests that the average consumer adjusts towards actual inflation, but that our
consumer groups adjust by larger amounts.
Insert Tables 6 and 7 here
4.3 Robustness
We have conducted several robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity of our results
to our modelling choices. For brevity, we will only show those that relate to the bias of
consumers relative to actual inflation (i.e., those reported in Table 4), but results generally
hold also for the other analyses. For the first robustness check, we added lagged actual
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inflation as an explanatory variable to the regression (see Table 8). As a matter of fact,
consumers are responsive to past developments of inflation, with higher inflation rates
lowering the bias. The magnitudes by which the bias of our consumer groups is elevated
relative to the others remains largely unchanged, as does the effect of perceived news.
The coeffi cients on media reporting are somewhat smaller (reflecting the fact that media
reporting is more intense when inflation is high), but the sign remains unchanged: more
media reporting lowers the bias, and much more so for our respective consumer groups
(with the magnitude of the interaction terms being roughly unchanged).13
Another robustness test checks for those consumers that are pessimistic about major
purchases, or see themselves in a diffi cult financial situation, but mention that this is due
to increasing prices (whereas so far, these had been excluded from the household groups).
Of course, we would expect that these consumers have a substantially larger bias, and
this is indeed the case, as shown in Table 9. The exception is consumers who think that
times are bad to purchases a house due to prices —which is intuitive, as these respondents
most likely have house prices in mind when answering that question, so they need not
have a larger bias with regard to consumer prices. All other results go through with this
robustness test —perceived news increase the bias, and media reporting decreases it, and
particularly so for the pessimistic households.
Insert Tables 8 to 10 here
A third robustness test relates to those consumers that have changed their attitudes
between interviews (i.e., those that changed their attribute over time, and fell into the
category during their second interview, but not during the first interview). Results for
the level of the bias, shown in Table 10, are qualitatively unchanged — those who fall
into the respective category only during the second interview have a significantly larger
upward bias. However, their reaction to media reporting is now estimated to be the same
as for all the other consumers, suggesting that media reporting primarily helps reducing
the elevated bias of persistently pessimistic consumers.
Finally, our benchmark model contains a variable that indicated whether a respondent
has heard news about prices. One might wonder whether the effect is more prominent
had we only included respondents that have heard news about rising prices. As discussed
earlier, most of the observations for this variable originate from respondents having heard
about rising prices, whereas very few report to have heard about declining prices. Re-
placing our variable for perceived news to include only news about rising prices does not
alter our results (which are not shown for brevity).
13In an alternative regression we have also included gasoline price inflation in the set of regressors.
However, despite the close connection between hearing news about prices and increases in gasoline prices,
the coeffi cient attached to NEWSP remains statistically significant and preserves its sign.
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5 Conclusions
How do consumers form inflation expectations? This paper has used the micro-data of
the Michigan Survey to shed further light on this important question. While it has been
well known that a number of socioeconomic characteristics like gender, age, education or
income affect inflation expectations, we have shown that the same also holds true for con-
sumer attitudes. Having pessimistic attitudes towards the purchase of durables or homes,
experiencing or expecting financial diffi culties as well as expectations that household in-
come will go down in the future affects inflation expectations in a substantial fashion. It
increases the upward bias that is anyway inherent in consumer inflation expectations and
worsens forecast accuracy. The effects are not only found to be statistically significant,
they are furthermore substantial in magnitude.
Generally, consumer inflation expectations are highly sensitive to perceived news
about rising prices, which themselves are tightly connected to the evolution of gaso-
line prices. Rising gasoline prices are being noticed much more than falling gasoline
prices, and they lead consumers to revise their expectations more frequently, but worsen
their bias. This is in contrast to media reporting about inflation, which similarly tends
to induce a higher updating frequency of consumers. Importantly, however, more in-
tense media reporting lowers the bias, and especially so for pessimistic households and
households in dire financial situations.
The findings have important implications for policy makers. They suggest that more
communication about inflation improves consumers’inflation expectations, and particu-
larly so for consumers that are in the right tail of the distribution, i.e. those that have a
particularly strong upward bias.
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perceptions of inflation: An experimental study,”European Economic Review, 67(C),
144—158.
18
Heckman, J. J. (1979): “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,”Econometrica,
47(1), 153—61.
Jonung, L. (1981): “Perceived and Expected Rates of Inflation in Sweden,”American
Economic Review, 71(5), 961—68.
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky (1979): “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk,”Econometrica, 47(2), 263—91.
Lamla, M. J., and T. Maag (2012): “The Role of Media for Inflation Forecast Dis-
agreement of Households and Professionals,”Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
44(7), 1325—1350.
Lombardelli, C., and J. Saleheen (2003): “Public expectations of UK inflation,”
Bank of England Quarterly bulletin, 43, 281—290.
Malgarini, M. (2009): “Quantitative Inflation Perceptions and Expectations of Italian
Consumers,”Giornale degli Economisti, 68(1), 53—80.
Malmendier, U., and S. Nagel (2013): “Learning from Inflation Experiences,”
Mimeo, UC Berkeley and Stanford University.
Mankiw, N. G., and R. Reis (2002): “Sticky Information Versus Sticky Prices: A
Proposal To Replace The New Keynesian Phillips Curve,”The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 117(4), 1295—1328.
Mankiw, N. G., R. Reis, and J. Wolfers (2004): “Disagreement about Inflation
Expectations,”NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, 18, 209—248.
Menz, J.-O., and P. Poppitz (2013): “Households’disagreement on inflation expec-
tations and socioeconomic media exposure in Germany,”Discussion Papers 27/2013,
Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
Oehlert, G. W. (1992): “A Note on the Delta Method,”The American Statistician,
46(1), pp. 27—29.
Pfajfar, D., and E. Santoro (2009): “Asymmetries in Inflation Expectations Across
Sociodemographic Groups,”Mimeo, Tilburg University.
(2013): “News on Inflation and the Epidemiology of Inflation Expectations,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 45(6), 1045—1067.
Ranyard, R., F. D. Missier, N. Bonini, D. Duxbury, and B. Summers (2008):
“Perceptions and expectations of price changes and inflation: A review and conceptual
framework,”Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(4), 378—400.
19
Reis, R. (2006): “Inattentive consumers,”Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(8), 1761—
1800.
Sims, C. A. (2003): “Implications of rational inattention,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 50(3), 665—690.
Snir, A., and D. Levy (2011): “Shrinking Goods and Sticky Prices: Theory and
Evidence,”Working Paper Series 17/11, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
Souleles, N. S. (2004): “Expectations, Heterogeneous Forecast Errors, and Consump-
tion: Micro Evidence from the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Surveys,” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 36(1), 39—72.
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman (1974): “Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics
and biases,”Science, 185, 1124—1131.
Webley, P., and R. Spears (1986): “Economic preferences and inflationary expecta-
tions,”Journal of Economic Psychology, 7(3), 359—369.
20
Figures and Tables








1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
CPI Inflation (+1 year) SPF Mean Forecast
MS Mean Forecast
Notes: The chart reports the MS and the SPF mean forecasts for inflation at t+12, as well
as inflation as realized at t+ 12. Based on monthly data.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
CPI Inflation Heard about changing prices
News Stories
Notes: The chart reports CPI inflation as recorded for a given time period t, as well the
share of respondents in the MS in period t answering that they have heard news about prices
("perceived news") and the index about media reporting related to inflation in period t ("news
stories"). Based on monthly data.
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1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
CPI Inflation Heard: decreasing prices
Heard: increasing prices
Notes: The chart reports CPI inflation as recorded for a given time period t, as well the share
of respondents in the MS in period t answering that they have heard about prices increasing /
decreasing. Based on monthly data.
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1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Heard: incr. prices (left axis) Pos. gas. infl . (right axis)
Notes: The chart reports the share of respondents in the MS in period t answering that they
have heard about prices increasing, as well retail gasoline price inflation (truncated at zero for
negative values).
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Notes: The chart reports the share of respondents in the MS in period t answering that the
time for purchasing durables / vehicles / houses is bad.
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